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
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IN THE THIRD WORLD

Francis Fukuyama

February 1984

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IN THE THIRD WORLD¹

Francis Fukuyama

February 1984

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over much of the postwar period the Third World has constituted the chief arena of East-West competition, and promises to remain so for the foreseeable future. The extraordinary burst of Soviet activism beginning with the October 1973 Middle East war and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan was responsible, more than any other factor, for American disillusionment with detente and the subsequent broad decline in U.S.-Soviet relations. There is, however, considerable disagreement over the significance of Soviet behavior and the extent to which it affects American security. The argument has been made, particularly in Europe, that the Soviet threat from and to the Third World has been vastly overblown because of the ephemeral nature of Soviet influence and the West's marginal stake in most countries there. Now that we are in the midst of a prolonged succession process during which Third World policy will almost certainly be reevaluated in Moscow, it would be useful to stand back and assess the military dimension of postwar Soviet policy in the Third World and its contemporary implications. Specifically, this article will attempt to answer three related questions: first, to what degree have military considerations been a driving force behind Soviet activities in the Third World; second, what is the military significance of Soviet gains there to date; and third, to what extent have the Soviets been pursuing a systematic strategy, particularly in the past decade.—

There are numerous ways of categorizing the heterogeneous clients Moscow has acquired (and in many cases lost) since the end of World War II,¹ some of which are summarized in the table at the end of this article. Since this discussion focuses on the military side of things, we need to look more closely at the precise nature of the military relationship Moscow has maintained with each one. The nature of the military relationship, in turn, can be analyzed along two dimensions: first, the objective military value of the client to the Soviet Union,

¹Thus arbitrarily excluding Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and North Korea from the consideration.

measured in terms of things like geostrategic position and strength of the state's indigenous forces, and second, the "quality" of Soviet influence over the state in question, e.g., the durability of the Soviet presence, the willingness of the client to act militarily on behalf of Soviet security interests, willingness to permit Soviet forces to operate from its territory, and so on. These two measures are related to one another and yet independent: the military value of a state like Angola may be enhanced by the fact that the quality of Soviet influence is fairly high, but due to its geographical location it remains less important militarily than an independent and relatively unreliable Vietnam.

While military forces are a *means* of improving the "quality" of Soviet influence (for instance, through the provision of Cuban troops or East German security services--see Section III below), the *ends* that higher quality influence serves are frequently political rather than military. It is embarrassing to have a client flout Soviet wishes in the UN or expel Soviet advisors, regardless of whether it is strategically placed astride sea lanes. The argument of this paper will be that while a good deal of Soviet behavior in the Third World up through the early seventies could be explained in terms of Moscow's search for geostrategic positions of concrete military value, the most important Soviet objectives were achieved by the early seventies. While still concerned with geostrategic position, Moscow's emphasis over the past decade has turned much more to the problem of improving the "quality" of its influence in existing positions, and that this trend is likely to continue in the future.

I. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY FACTOR

A short answer to the question of how important military considerations have been as a determinant of overall Soviet behavior in the Third World is that such considerations, and particularly the requirements generated by Moscow's strategic nuclear posture, have indeed played a major role in establishing the overall scope and direction of Soviet expansion in the Third World. This statement, however, is subject to several qualifications.

First, the military factor competes with political and economic motives in Soviet thinking, and will never by itself provide a full explanation of Soviet behavior. This does not mean however that it is not interesting to note military themes and patterns within the larger mosaic.

Second, the Soviets have consistently maintained a relatively long-term view of their interests, and have frequently subordinated immediate military goals to other concerns, for example the desire to expand Moscow's fund of general political influence in a particular country. Political influence is a fungible commodity which can be cashed in at later time for tangible assets like bases or facilities, but it is also desirable in its own right and is often an end to which military power is a means, rather than vice versa.

Finally, the character of Soviet military interests has changed over time, with the strategic nuclear dimension assuming relatively greater importance in the first three postwar decades than subsequently. We therefore need to look at Soviet policy in a more concrete historical context.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviets were not preoccupied with a strategic requirement for overseas bases, and indeed withdrew from Porkkala Udd in Finland and Port Arthur and Dairen in China in the interests of better relations with the countries concerned. By the time of Moscow's turn towards the Third World during the 1950's, however, Soviet policy was directly shaped by concerns related to the strategic nuclear balance. The United States at that time was seeking to erect a strategic containment barrier through the establishment of a series of interlocking defensive pacts around the periphery of of the USSR, of which the repeated efforts to organize the countries of the Northern Tier into various pro-Western alliances like the Baghdad Pact and CENTO were a part. Underlying these alliances was a very concrete military rationale: given the relatively limited ranges of early strategic systems (i.e., medium-range B-47 bombers, IRBMs, and carrier-based aviation), implementation of the Dulles-era massive retaliation strategy required a network of bases and intelligence facilities close to the Soviet Union. Without denying the role of chance and

opportunism, one important motive for Moscow's cultivation of Nasser and its subsequent establishment of ties with a number of important Arab states was to find a way of neutralizing U.S. strategic assets in the Northern Tier, particularly in Iraq. Khrushchev appears to have regarded Egypt and Syria initially as bargaining chips, and called repeatedly for a Great Power conference on the Middle East which in effect would have traded the Soviet position in the Middle East heartland for Western positions in the Northern Tier.²

The pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World from the early 60's to the early 70's had a more or less coherent strategic rationale as well. The Soviet objective of disrupting the Baghdad Pact was largely achieved with the Iraqi revolution in 1958, while the importance to the U.S. of regions on the periphery of the USSR like the Northern Tier declined with the development of ICBMs and long-range bombers (U.S. IRBMs in Turkey, for example, were unilaterally withdrawn following the Cuban missile crisis). On the other hand, changes in naval technology created two new missions for the Soviet navy: first, to deploy and protect their own first and second generation SSBNs in forward patrol areas near the U.S. coastline,³ and second, to counter U.S. missile-carrying submarines in *their* forward deployment areas. In addition, range increases in American carrier-based aircraft now permitted the U.S. to deliver nuclear strikes against Soviet territory from areas like the Eastern Mediterranean. The deployment of a permanent Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean after 1964 for ASW and anti-carrier missions generated a substantial overseas basing requirement. Hence, the inherent importance of countries like Egypt, Syria, and Algeria grew in Soviet eyes as they began to search around the Mediterranean littoral for support facilities. More distant countries like Cuba, Somalia, Guinea, and the PDRY offered similar support opportunities for forward-deployed Soviet submarines.⁴

²For example, Khrushchev sent notes to the U.S., Britain, and France on Sept. 2, 1957, during the Syrian-Turkish crisis, proposing negotiations between the four powers leading up to an agreement on the mutual renunciation of force and restraint in arms deliveries.

³The Soviet sea-based deterrent has also included cruise-missile firing submarines since the 1950's, with deployment and support requirements similar to early generation SSBNs.

⁴See Michael McGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet

It should be noted, of course, that these strategic calculations can account for only a part of Soviet policy towards the Third World during either the 50s or 60s. Moscow's assiduous cultivation of India or Indonesia during the 50's, for example, was totally unrelated to the nuclear balance, as was its grooming of clients like Mali, Nigeria, or the Congo in the 60's.

What are we to make of the numerous and varied Soviet Third World activities from 1975 to the present? While I think one can uncover a systematic pattern in recent Soviet tactics (elaborated in Section III below), it is a bit harder to detect a unifying pattern with regard to ends. Certainly China constituted one important theme: once war with the People's Republic became a real possibility after 1969, Soviet planners had to take seriously the problem of maintaining sea lines of communication to the Soviet Far East. This helps to explain a good deal of Moscow's interest in the Indian Ocean and the quest for facilities in places like Ethiopia and the PDRY. Vietnam not only provided facilities for reconnaissance and forces forward deployed in the Indian Ocean, but was itself a substantial military counterweight to China. Finally, Moscow's intense courtship of India, particularly after the invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, was designed to keep China encircled from the south.

On the other hand, it is fairly clear that considerations related to the strategic nuclear balance played a considerably smaller role in the 70s than in the previous two decades. In large measure this was because Moscow had successfully achieved its earlier objectives: U.S. strategic systems were driven away from its periphery, and forward naval deployments in critical areas like the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans were implemented with the acquisition of basing facilities in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Somalia. Technological improvements in Soviet submarine-launched missile ranges allowed them to move to bastion defense of their SSBN fleet in near protected oceans like the Barents Sea or the Sea of Okhotsk, reducing requirements for long-range forward deployments⁵. Similarly, American SLBM ranges improved and vastly

Seapower," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings/Naval Review*, May 1980. pp. 165-166.

expanded the ocean areas in which U.S. submarines could patrol. Since the Soviets were never able to develop significant open-ocean ASW capabilities, they they began to reach a point of diminishing marginal returns with regard to this mission.⁶

Throughout the postwar period, the Soviets have never been reluctant to press their clients hard for access to military facilities. Sadat and Heikal, for example, both document the strong and consistent pressure brought to bear on Egypt for access to naval facilities. The Soviets reportedly held out stubbornly for access to Cam Ranh Bay during their negotiations with the Vietnamese on the 1978 Friendship Treaty. On the other hand, Moscow has never made access to facilities a *sine qua non* of support for otherwise sympathetic clients, and have proven willing to sink enormous amounts of money into clients who had no immediate prospects of direct military payoff (e.g., India and North Yemen).⁷ Indeed, Moscow's courtship of Ethiopia in 1977-78 indicated that while the Soviets had a long-term strategic view of the importance of the Horn of Africa, they were willing to risk the sacrifice, at least in the short-run, of a concrete military asset--the naval facility at Berbera--for the sake of the vaguer goal of increased political influence.⁸

⁶Although the number and visibility of the surface combatants and long-range SNA aircraft needed to protect these bastions increased enormously. However, The Soviets have evidently deployed a number of Delta-class SSBNs in the mid-Atlantic (i.e., outside of their normal bastions) as one response to the U.S. deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe.

⁶ See McGwire, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

⁷To my mind, North Yemen is one of the most puzzling of all Soviet aid cases. Moscow poured in the neighborhood of \$750 million into this country following the 1979 border confrontation with the PDRY. While their objective was clearly to prevent the YAR from falling totally under Saudi influence, the payoff that the Soviets get in return for this enormous investment is very marginal.

⁸The Soviet gamble has evidently paid off, since Moscow has been able to replace Berbera with Dahlak Island and Asmara on the Red Sea coast.

II. THIRD WORLD CLIENTS: HOW MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT?

Whatever mix of strategic, political, and economic motives governed the Soviet Union's historical acquisition of allies in the Third World, the question remains as to what the past thirty years of Soviet activity adds up to militarily. The following section attempts to assess the present military significance of Moscow's major Third World clients and the Soviet Union's strategic stake in them, ranking them in order of overall military value. It is evident that there is no necessary correlation between objective military value and the "quality" of influence; the Soviets exercise the greatest degree of control over states like Ethiopia, the PDRY, and Angola which rank relatively low in terms of strategic importance.

A preliminary distinction has to be made between these clients' wartime role in a direct U.S.-USSR conflict, and their role in conflicts short of general war. In the former case, many of the constraints that have characterized postwar Soviet behavior in the Third World will be lifted, as well as inhibitions on U.S. use of force in response. The latter case covers a wide variety of contingencies, ranging from a superpower clash in the Persian Gulf that remains localized to support for low-level conflicts between U.S. and Soviet clients. In either case one has to consider the net effect of both U.S. and Soviet moves on the political calculations of the local ally involved. In addition, the Soviets have to be concerned with a second "big war" scenario, namely, conflict with the PRC.⁹

Cuba. Cuba's principal value to the Soviet Union lies in its role as the primary support for Moscow's worldwide network of revolutionary activities. Cuba's military role in advancing of Soviet Third World policies is well known and does not need to be detailed here; Havana in fact has been involved sooner and in more countries than the Soviets themselves (see the Appendix).

⁹SSBNs present a special case. While these weapons would only be used in a general war, their effectiveness in war depends entirely on the success with which they can be deployed in peacetime. The importance of a given Soviet client in either facilitating the deployment of Soviet SSBNs or countering U.S. submarines hence straddles the wartime/peacetime distinction.

Cuba's close alignment with Moscow is based on several factors, the most important of which are Havana's economic dependence on the Soviet subsidy, its reliance on the deterrent effect of Soviet military power against the United States, and Castro's ideological orientation which puts many of his own interests in parallel with those of the Soviets. In addition, Cuba's DGI and security services are by now probably fairly well penetrated by Soviet bloc intelligence. In spite of this, Cuba remains more independent of Soviet control than an East European ally like Bulgaria. It is possible to cite any number of instances where Cuban and Soviet views have diverged. To cite one recent example, the Cubans were much quicker to recognize the revolutionary potential of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua than the Soviets, who initially instructed the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (i.e., the local Communist party) to stand aloof from them. In Angola, Cuban forces actually had to help suppress a coup attempt in May 1977 by Nito Alves, who was reportedly a staunch supporter of close association with Moscow rather than Havana. Many aspects of the new approach described in Section III below were in fact invented by the Cubans rather than the Soviets.

But while the Cubans are not robot-like proxies, it is possible to make too much of their divergences with the Soviets.¹⁰ Cuban "deviation" generally consists of seeing opportunities for action sooner than the Soviets, and the willingness to take greater initiative and risks on behalf of their ideological brethren. In almost all cases, beginning with Angola, the Soviets were eventually convinced to go along with the Cuban game.

Cuba's potential military role in a general U.S.-Soviet conflict is potentially large, due to its position in the Straits of Florida. Approximately forty percent of all U.S. ground reinforcements going to Europe would either embark from Gulf coast ports like Beaumont, Texas, or would pass through the Panama Canal from the West Coast. In addition, a great deal of North American refinery capacity is located in the Caribbean within range of long-range tactical aircraft operating out of Cuba.¹¹ The offensive capability of Soviet ground and air forces

¹⁰See for example William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola", *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring/Summer 1978.

¹¹See R. Bruce McColm, "Central America and the Caribbean: the Larger Scenario," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1983.

presently based in Cuba is limited,¹² but Cuba could serve as a useful forward base for Soviet attack submarines. There are a number of relatively simple measures the Cubans themselves could take, such as mining the Straits of Florida or interdicting SLOCs with submarines and aircraft, that would cause enormous disruptions in U.S. mobilization schedules.¹³

The U.S., of course, has a number of counters to Soviet/Cuban operations in the Caribbean, though most of them involve significant costs. It is safe to say that the costs of a ground invasion would be prohibitive, especially given the Cuban buildup in 1981-82 which has brought the fully mobilized strength of the Cuban military to nearly one million. A more sensible alternative would be an interdiction campaign against air and naval targets in Cuba, but even this would require the diversion of air and naval assets at a time when they will be urgently needed elsewhere.¹⁴

The question remains as to how Castro is likely to behave in the event of a U.S.-Soviet showdown in Europe or the Persian Gulf. My own suspicion is that however close Cuban-Soviet legal and political ties are at present, Castro will most likely want to declare Cuba neutral and avoid acts like sealane interdiction that would inevitably bring down

¹²There are currently 6-8,000 Soviet civilian advisors and 2,000 military advisors in Cuba, in addition to a ground forces brigade near Havana with approximately 2,600 men. These forces have no projection capability and were almost certainly deployed in order to deter a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Since 1975 the Soviets have regularly operated TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft out of Cuba. They have also deployed surface combatants at irregular intervals to Cuban ports and, less frequently, submarines (including ballistic missile carrying submarines). It is interesting to note that the Victor-class SSN recently disabled off the East Coast of the United States was towed to Cuba. See *Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence* (U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 103, August 1982).

¹³It is important to note, however, that these are largely *potential* missions: the Cubans have recently acquired two Foxtrot attack submarines and have no mining capabilities at present.

¹⁴A final alternative is to threaten Castro with nuclear weapons, in which case the United States must be prepared to accept the possibility of initiating nuclear warfare in its own hemisphere.

severe U.S. retaliation. Even under these circumstances, however, Cuba would continue to tie down U.S. forces and preoccupy U.S. planners, since Cuban neutrality could not be assured over the long run.

The fact that the Soviets do not currently base SSBNs in Cuba does not mean that they would not like to do so. Despite the general Soviet move towards bastion defense of its newer Delta and Typhoon class submarines, a number of older Yankee-class SSBNs with missiles of substantially shorter range as well as SLCM armed submarines will remain in the inventory, which are usually on station somewhere in the mid-Atlantic. A submarine base in Cuba would cut the length of time required for these submarines to reach their patrol areas dramatically. The Soviets do not have such a base only because of their fears of the likely U.S. reaction to the stationing of strategic systems in Cuba; the pattern of steady incrementalism in the deployment of Soviet submarines to Cuba before and after the August 1970 Cienfuegos incident indicates Moscow's continued interest.¹⁵ The Soviets can be expected to continue testing the limits of the 1962 understanding on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba, until it meets firm opposition from the United States.

Vietnam. Soviet influence over Vietnam stems primarily from Hanoi's enormous economic dependence on Moscow, and its need for political and military support initially against the United States and then against China. The relationship resembles a business partnership more than a marriage, however; the Vietnamese, having fought both the U.S. and China successfully with no direct Soviet support, are tough and independent customers who look first to their own national interests. Thus Vietnam has participated more marginally in the Soviet collective security network than smaller and weaker clients; apart from workers exported to the Soviet Union, it has not sent its combat forces outside of Southeast Asia.

The Soviets appear to attach considerable importance to military facilities in Vietnam, since there is circumstantial evidence that they pushed the Vietnamese quite hard to secure access to Cam Ranh Bay and

¹⁵This is documented in B. Blechman and S. Levinson, "Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba," in M. McGwire and J. McDonald, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 426-441.

other sites during negotiations over the Friendship Treaty in November 1978.¹⁶ Their interest in Vietnam, however, stems primarily from considerations related to the PRC. In the event of war with China, the Soviets would become highly dependent on SLOCs running through the Indian Ocean as an alternative to the vulnerable land routes to the Soviet Far East. Since 1979 Cam Ranh Bay has played a major role in supporting Soviet Indian Ocean deployments, which originate from distant Vladivostok (China, of course, is not the only Soviet concern here). Facilities in Vietnam are very useful for intelligence collection vis a vis both China and the United States, and could be used to stage air and naval attacks on the PRC. In theory, Vietnam's substantial ground forces could be brought to bear against China in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, though here the Soviets would have to contend with a very independent minded Vietnamese leadership which would follow a strict interpretation of their own national interests.

The significance of Vietnam and Soviet facilities there like Cam Ranh Bay in the event of general U.S.-Soviet conflict is somewhat smaller than that of Cuba. The primary threat is again against sea lanes.¹⁷ While it is true that Vietnam sits astride important SLOCs running from the Persian Gulf and Europe to the Far East, their importance is primarily economic rather than military; U.S allies in the Pacific could probably withstand a disruption of the southern Pacific sea lanes for a good thirty days without serious damage to their economies. The primary locus of a U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Far East would be Northeast Asia, with Vietnam playing a somewhat peripheral role.

¹⁶See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, R-2943-AF (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1982), p. 92.

¹⁷The Soviets have a submarine tender and a shelter for SSNs at Cam Ranh Bay, and have deployed Echoes and Foxtrots there, as well as surface combatants. TU-95 reconnaissance flights are flown out of Vietnam regularly, and Vietnamese airfields could serve as recovery bases for Backfires attacking U.S. bases in the Philippines. Vietnamese SLOC interdiction capabilities are limited to a couple of Foxtrots and some small surface combatants.

As in the case of Cuba, the United States has the ability to counter Soviet force projection capabilities in Vietnam. Cam Ranh Bay is relatively more vulnerable than Cuban bases, and it could most likely be neutralized by U.S. carrier battle groups transiting from the Indian Ocean to Northeast Asia at the outset of a war--though not without cost. Since Soviet facilities in Vietnam are to a certain extent targets of opportunity, they will tend to tie down fewer U.S. forces than Cuba. The problem for the United States would not be the narrow military one of striking the Soviets in Vietnam, however, but the larger one of dealing with Vietnamese military power, the largest in Southeast Asia. For example, the U.S. would have to consider the possibility that direct military action against Vietnam would incur a Vietnamese reaction against Thailand, which would be difficult to support in the event the U.S. or PRC were preoccupied elsewhere.

Afghanistan. Of all of Moscow's client states, Afghanistan most closely resembles an outright Soviet dependency and may eventually assume a status like that of Mongolia. The cadres of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, not strong to begin with, have been so weakened by civil war and infighting between the Khalq and Percham factions that the Soviets and their other allies have virtually had to run Afghanistan's armed forces, security services, and civilian ministries themselves, beginning even before the December 1979 invasion.

Afghanistan's strategic importance lies in the fact that by occupying it, Soviet aircraft and ground forces have moved 500 miles closer to the Persian Gulf and the northern Indian Ocean. While it is doubtful that such considerations were the *primary* motivating force behind the Soviet decision to intervene, they nonetheless are likely to have played some role. Similarly, while the major expansion of the Shindand air base over the past three years can probably be explained in terms of the support requirements of counterinsurgency war against the Afghan *mujahedeen*, it would also be highly functional in the event of a Soviet move on the Gulf.

Moscow's advantageous strategic position in Southwest Asia arises from the fact that it shares nearly 1000 miles of common border with Iran. Nonetheless, the occupation of Afghanistan confers significant strategic advantages. The 1941 *Command Study* of Iran prepared by the Soviet General Staff points to six major corridors through which the Soviet Union can invade Iran. Despite the infrastructural improvements that have taken place in the last 40 years, these six corridors remain the only viable entry points given the highly rugged, mountainous terrain of northern Iran. Afghanistan provides the Soviets with a seventh route considerably further south than the others, which is the fastest means of reaching the Persian Gulf at Chah Bahar. In addition, any U.S. aircraft carriers launching interdiction attacks on advancing Soviet forces would probably not venture further than the Straits of Hormuz; they would be out of range of tactical aircraft operating from bases on Soviet soil, but not from Shindand.

Syria. While the Soviets still value the naval facility at Latakia, one has to explain Moscow's enormous investment in Syria more in politico-military than purely military terms. With the defection of Egypt after 1972 and Iraq's recent disaffection with the Soviets, Damascus is Moscow's only major Arab ally and the sole support for any continuing Soviet role in the larger Arab-Israeli and Middle East games.

Despite a level of arms aid that has made Syria one of the most over-armed states in the world,¹⁸ Damascus over the years has probably represented a net military liability to the Soviets. The basic root of Moscow's predicament in the Eastern Mediterranean is Israeli military power and, behind Israel, the power of the United States. The 67, 73, and 82 wars all demonstrated Moscow's repeated lack of military options to support Syria against Israel: its own power projection forces are simply too weak to defend Syria against determined Israeli attack, such that it has had to rely on bluff and threats of escalation that are quite implausible on closer examination.

¹⁸Literally over-armed: *prior* to the Lebanon War, Syria had approximately 600 more tanks than it had qualified tank crews. With subsequent Soviet rearmament, this number has increased dramatically.

Recent events in Lebanon should not obscure for us these basic facts of life regarding the balance of power in the Middle East. Syria's apparent dominance in Lebanon at the end of 1983 and the resulting predicament for the United States is ultimately traceable to the Israeli decision to withdraw from that country in early 1983, which in turn resulted from the enormous domestic turmoil and war-weariness that developed in Israel in the winter of 1982-83. This cannot be regarded as a permanent condition, since Israel will remain the dominant military power in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

Moscow's influence over Syria is of the traditional sort that characterized its relationships with Third World clients in the 50s and 60s, being based almost entirely on arms supply. The Soviets reached their current level of involvement incrementally; in fact, it was the basic weakness in their ability to support the Syrians through more direct means that led to continuing attempts to buy off Damascus through ever larger promises of arms aid.

The Soviet decision to provide SA-5 and SS-21 missiles to Syria after the Lebanon war, as well as Soviet combat forces to man the air defense network, is in many respects a classic example of this cycle, but in other respects represents a significant increase in Soviet willingness to take risks. The only prior instance of comparable adventurism I can think of is when the Soviets warned Nasser and the Syrians of an impending Israeli attack in May 1967, an act that led directly to the June War. The Soviets paid dearly for this miscalculation, and a good deal of their subsequent cautious behavior between the June and October Wars can be traced directly to their desire not to repeat that experience. What is interesting about the recent Soviet deployments to Syria is that the current Moscow leadership seems to have forgotten the earlier lesson. At the time the decision to deploy the SA-5s was made, the Soviets could not have known that the Israelis would withdraw from Lebanon as quickly as they subsequently did; Moscow ran a substantial risk of provoking and then getting caught in a major Syrian-Israeli skirmish in which it could have taken substantial combat casualties. While the Soviet gamble paid off in the short-run, the risk-taking propensity that it reflects is high and may augur more unpredictable Soviet behavior in the future.

Libya. To an even greater extent than Castro, Qaddafi's fertile imagination has led him to create and run a network of revolutionary enterprises in the Middle East and Africa, with branch offices as far afield as Central America, Northern Ireland, and the Philippines. The Soviets treat Libya like a partly-owned subsidiary into which they have pumped a certain amount of venture capital. The fact that Qaddafi is more or less an independent actor¹⁹ and that the Soviets have generally not been able to control his day-to-day behavior does not mean that they do not support the bulk of his different activities or find him an extremely useful ally. In fact, their apparent arms-length relationship is advantageous because it allows them to disavow responsibility and avoid potentially embarrassing entanglements with the U.S., France, or other Western countries.²⁰

Libya has served two primary functions for the Soviets. First, it has actively sought out opportunities to destabilize a wide variety of pro-Western regimes. The Reagan Administration's tougher line on Libya has provoked derision in some quarters because of the feeling that Libya deserves to be treated as no more than a minor irritant. To the contrary, the threat from Libya is potentially one of major strategic significance. Libya's targets have included not only weak African states, but U.S. regional allies like Egypt and the Sudan as well. While a Libyan connection has not been established in the Sadat assassination, Qaddafi has certainly supported similar conspiracies in the past, and needs to succeed only once to deal the U.S. a major setback. Libya's second function is as a conduit for arms supply into regions like Central America or Lebanon where a more open Soviet role would be too provocative. Libya, like Syria, possesses enormous stockpiles of weapons (including nearly 3,000 tanks)²¹ for which the manpower to

¹⁹This may be changing, however, as a result of East German influence (see Section III, p. 21 below).

²⁰The Gulf of Sidra incident and the two Libyan invasions of Chad indicate that the Soviets are not willing to support Qaddafi with anything more than rhetoric and access to arms supply (which he can pay for in any case with hard currency).

²¹To put this in perspective, Britain and France respectively deploy only about 1,000 medium tanks apiece.

operate them does not exist. These stockpiles may either serve as inventory for retransfer, or possibly as a form of prepositioned equipment that can be operated in a crisis by other Soviet-bloc forces.

Libya's position on NATO's southern flank also gives it a certain wartime significance as well, though of a much lesser magnitude than either Cuba or Vietnam. The Soviets are able to improve their reconnaissance of the Western Mediterranean by operating from Libyan bases, and could harass naval traffic south of Malta. Interdicting Libyan airbases would be a relatively simple task for CINCSOUTH, but would nonetheless constitute another drag on NATO assets.

Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The military significance of Ethiopia and the PDRY grew substantially after the Soviet expulsion from Berbera, Somalia, in 1977, where the Soviets had a fairly sophisticated naval base and missile-handling facility. Soviet access to some facility in this area is crucial to their ability to maintain on station a squadron, originating primarily from the Pacific Fleet, in the Indian Ocean. In addition, landing rights give the Soviets important intelligence data on Western air and naval activities in a part of the world that has great strategic significance with respect to both China and the United States. The anchorage that the Ethiopians have provided the Soviets off Dahlak Island is a poor substitute for Berbera, however, since it is on the Red Sea side of the Bab al-Mandab and is separated from the as yet unpacified Eritrean hinterland. Nonetheless, when combined with the excellent port facilities in Aden, it provides the Soviets with an adequate support infrastructure for peacetime Indian Ocean deployments.

Ethiopia and the PDRY have already demonstrated their military value in facilitating Soviet and Cuban intervention in low-level conflicts throughout the Middle East and Africa. The two countries form a unit of sorts, since they are geographically proximate and have been intimately involved in maintaining each other's security. The Tripartite Agreement signed jointly with Libya in 1981 is just one manifestation of a rather wide-ranging cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, they are most valuable to the Soviet Union militarily for the support they are able to render to other members of

the Soviet "collective security" system. Their wartime significance is smaller, since they could be rather easily neutralized by U.S. naval forces in the area. Nonetheless, their existence complicates American wartime planning and will be a drag on assets urgently needed in other theaters.

Angola and Mozambique. By the time we reach sub-Saharan Africa, it is safe to say that the Soviet political stake greatly overshadows military interests. Angola and Mozambique were the first successes of the Cuban-initiated strategy in Africa and represented qualitatively different types of clients, insofar as they were led by self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes highly dependent on Soviet/Cuban support and susceptible to strong Soviet influence. For a while in the mid-to-late 70s it looked as if they were part of a trend which might extend to Zimbabwe, Namibia, and perhaps even South Africa itself.

The military utility of Angola and Mozambique has rested largely on their ability to support other African liberation movements (e.g., SWAPO in Namibia or the ANC in South Africa). Both countries have provided the Soviet Union with landing rights and port facilities which enhance intelligence collection and provide support from Indian Ocean naval deployments. The value of either country as a strategic asset has been steadily declining over time, however, as a result of a combination of internal opposition and South African military pressure. It is probably safe to say that Angola has actually become a liability: with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in control of nearly two-thirds of Angola's territory, the Soviets and Cubans may soon be facing a critical decision on whether to dramatically increase their level of support to prevent the MPLA government from being overthrown. Angola's situation is comparable to that of Moscow's Arab clients when facing Israel, with the important difference that the United States is legally prohibited from backing the Angolan regimes opponents and hence cannot directly confront a Soviet intervention. The Soviets undoubtedly have the power to prevent an MPLA defeat, but it will be potentially costly for them to undertake such a commitment at so distant a geographical remove.

There has been a tendency to overstate the strategic value of Soviet positions in sub-Saharan Africa. The argument has been made that this region is critical because it (1) lies astride SLOCs going around

the Horn of Africa, and (2) is the source of numerous natural resources, particularly rare metals needed in a number of important aerospace applications.²² The problem with both arguments is that it is very difficult to imagine a situation short of general war in which the Soviets could use their African clients for either SLOC interdiction or resource denial. Peacetime SLOC interdiction would in itself constitute a *casus belli*, an act of unlikely recklessness. The case of Angola suggests that Soviet clients will have every incentive to maintain normal economic and trade relationships with the West, since any African regime no matter how revolutionary is likely to face severe economic problems and will not come close to the position of leverage exercised by the OPEC oil producers in 1973. On the other hand, in the event of general war the geographical remoteness of Angola and Mozambique from Soviet power will make it quite easy for the U.S. or other Western countries to neutralize them quickly. They will have some nuisance value--and these nuisances all over the world add up--but in the end they cannot be regarded as strategically critical.

III. A SYSTEMATIC STRATEGY IN THE 1970S?

The question remains as to whether it is possible to see a systematic strategy behind the various Soviet activities in the Third World since the early 70s, since, as we have seen, requirements of nuclear and naval strategy came to play a relatively smaller role. The answer depends entirely on how one defines "systematic strategy." If the term implies a grand strategy for achieving specific territorial objectives on a fixed timetable in the manner of Hitler's Hossbach Memorandum, then the answer is almost certainly no. The major Soviet advances of the past decade in Angola and Mozambique, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and Afghanistan appear to have come about as a result of aggressive Soviet exploitation of opportunities created in local contexts, rather than through a plan thought out and initiated in advance.²³ Anyone familiar with regions like the Middle East and Africa

²²See for example Gregory D. Foster, "On Selective Intervention," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 55-55, or the publication *Soviet Military Power* (U.S. Department of Defense, 1983), p. 90.

²³One conspiracy theory popular in conservative Arab circles in the late 70s was the idea that Soviet activities in Ethiopia and the PDRY

will realize that long-term strategic planning is virtually impossible for either superpower to achieve or implement given the extreme instability of local politics and the weakness of most superpower instruments of leverage.

If, on the other hand, by "systematic strategy" one means a consistent strategic aim -- such as the steady undermining of Western positions and the accretion of Soviet influence -- and a set of coherent tactical principles (as opposed to detailed plans) for achieving them, then the answer is arguably yes. Indeed, one can make a case that Soviet tactical principles for acquiring and maintaining Third World clients underwent a major revision in the mid-1970s, and that we are currently witnessing the results of that shift.²⁴

The reasons for this revision lay in the inherent weaknesses of the state-to-state dealings the Soviets maintained with their Third World clients up until the early 70's. Khrushchev's turn towards left-wing bourgeois nationalist regimes after 1955 was underwritten primarily by arms transfers, and secondarily by economic aid and promises of political and military assistance in conflicts with the West, the latter being honored by the Soviets more often than not in the breach. The types of regimes courted turned out to be unstable, nationalistic, and as a consequence politically unreliable, while arms transfers proved to be an extremely weak instrument of leverage. In many instances the entire Soviet position in a particular country rested on the fate of a single leader at the top like Sukharno, Keita, Nkrumah, or Sadat, whose death, overthrow, or defection could have disastrous consequences for the Soviets. Many clients such as Syria were able to extract enormous amounts of aid from Moscow for many years while resisting basic Soviet

were part of a "pincer movement" aimed at cutting off Western access to Persian Gulf oil. While this description of the aim is undoubtedly accurate, the Soviets did not exactly choose to end up in those particular countries. Given the choice, it is likely they would trade both in for their former position in Egypt.

²⁴I am indebted to two Rand colleagues, Alexander Alexiev and Stephen Hosmer, for many of the insights in this section. See Alexander Alexiev, *The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World*, Note N-1995-AF (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, June 1983), and Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice towards Third World Conflicts* (Boston: Lexington Books, 1983).

wishes (in this case, signature of a Friendship Treaty until 1980), while others like Egypt succeeded in dragging the .USSR into undesirable confrontations with the United States. Only Cuba (and possibly the PDRY) followed the path of "natural" development from bourgeois nationalist regimes into more or less orthodox Marxist-Leninist ones.

The new set of tactical principles evident in Soviet behavior from the mid-1970s on tackled the problem of improving the "quality" of Soviet influence by interfering more actively in the internal affairs of client states so as to institutionalize the relationship with the Soviet Union and make it more permanent--i.e., no more Sadats.²⁵ In the process the Soviets could hope to improve the degree of day-to-day cooperation and control they could expect to exercise. These principles included:

- In addition to arms transfers, direct military intervention by proxy forces like the Cubans, together with Soviet logistical support and expanded advisory missions;
- Establishment of direct police controls over the internal security apparatus of client regimes, particularly through the efforts of the East Germans;
- Efforts to push local leaders to establish "vanguard" parties, and the concomitant centralization of economic and political organs on a Leninist model;
- Where the choice was available, greater support for local Communist parties, not out of ideological conviction but because such parties tend to be more reliable politically;
- And finally, the building of a socialist Third World "collective security" network by which different members of the community could protect one another from deviationism in an organized fashion.

The potential of these tactical innovations is best illustrated by the East Germans, who have been overshadowed by the more visible Cuban presence but who have played what is perhaps an equally valuable role in

²⁵While some of these principles, particularly the emphasis on vanguard and/or Communist parties, have been alluded to in Soviet writings, the account below is drawn almost entirely from actual Soviet behavior since 1976. Since Brezhnev's death in 1982, there has also evidently been a debate on general Soviet Third World policy in Soviet leadership circles, with one group (which seems to include the late Andropov himself) arguing for retrenchment and greater selectivity among Third World clients. The prevalence of such a view would not be at all inconsistent with the interpretation of recent Soviet policy presented here. For evidence of this debate, see Stephen Sestanovich, "Moscow's Third World Reassessment" (unpublished paper, 1983).

terms of Soviet interests. The East German *Ministerium für Staatsicherheit* (MfS) has helped to organize the internal security organs in Angola, Mozambique, Libya, Ethiopia, the PDRY, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome, Nicaragua, and a number of other countries (a few of them even turned up in tiny Grenada). Libya's Qaddafi has been protected for the past several years by a bodyguard organized by an East German intelligence official named Karl Hanesch, who has reportedly saved the Libyan leader's life from major assassination attempts on at least two occasions in 1978 and 1981.²⁶ Now Qaddafi is far from being a pliant Soviet proxy--he is too much of an adventurist for Bolshevik tastes--but the Soviets are clearly better off with him alive than dead, and the East Germans give them a means of actively ensuring that he stays that way, as well as being a source of intelligence and influence (Hanesch is also said to be a close personal confidant). Similarly, the East Germans were heavily involved in restructuring the PDRY's security services at the time of the dual assassinations of the presidents of North and South Yemen in June 1978. We do not have direct evidence about the East German involvement in either event, but it would be very surprising if they did not play a role in helping Abd al-Fattah Ismail overthrow Selim Rubai Ali, and may well have engineered the coup themselves.²⁷ Direct police controls at the upper echelons of a weak Third World state can be more important than any quantity of Cubans or arms transfers; it is doubtful that the leaders of South Yemen could kick out the Cubans and Soviets if they wanted to.

The establishment of "vanguard" parties, preferably Marxist-Leninist ones, represents a longer term Soviet investment in the institutionalization of their relationship with the client. A vanguard party provides the Soviets with multiple entry points into the client's top leadership, giving them alternatives to the man at the top; helps to

²⁶*L'Express*, 4-10 Nov. 1983, pp. 104-105.

²⁷In addition to protecting existing positions, the East Germans have played an active role in creating new ones. There is considerable evidence that they (though not the Cubans) played a major role in training and encouraging the Katangan exile FNLC forces that invaded Zaire's Shaba province in 1978. See Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, "East German Security Policy in Africa," in Michel Radu, ed., *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East v. South* (Colorado Springs: Praeger, 1981), pp. 142-145.

make sure that there is some organizational structure which has a chance of surviving the personalized rule characteristic of many Third World states; serves as a kernel from which to build and control other centralized Leninist institutions; and provides a counter to revolutionary spontaneity (e.g., the EPRP in Ethiopia). It is furthermore desirable that a vanguard party should have a Marxist-Leninist ideology as well. By itself, ideology does not ensure a convergence of interests between patron and client, but *all other factors being equal*, a Marxist-Leninist party will tend to be a more reliable client.

Hence we find the Soviet Union investing heavily in Communist Cuba and Vietnam, establishing multiple ties with an avowedly Marxist regime in Aden, encouraging the MPLA in Angola and Mozambique's Frelimo to transform themselves organizationally into Leninist parties, and pushing Ethiopia's Mengistu to form a vanguard party, COWPE (the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia). Of course, promotion of local Communists does not always work: in 1977, Communists in the Iraqi army were viciously suppressed by the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Clients like Mengistu, moreover, seem to understand the Soviet game and for that reason has deliberately resisted Soviet blandishments to increase COWPE's power.²⁸

There is evidence to suggest that manifestations of the tactics outlined above are not haphazard occurrences, but represent a systematic approach which has been thought out in advance²⁹. Each instance of "cooperative intervention" has manifested more or less the same clearcut division of labor among the Soviets and their different proxies. Consider, for example, the following description of the laundering operation behind arms supply to the guerrillas in El Salvador:

²⁸In other cases, the Soviets have simply guessed wrong about who would be in the vanguard. For example, they discouraged local Communist parties in Central America from forming a united front with non-Communist leftist groups like the Sandinistas prior to the Nicaraguan revolution, a decision they later reversed.

²⁹"Thought out in advance" does not necessarily mean "thought out all at once"; the different elements of this strategy appear to have been developed incrementally, beginning with the intervention in Angola. Moreover, credit for the authorship of these tactics may belong in many cases more to the Cubans than to the Soviets.

particular care was taken to disguise the origins of [Soviet bloc] military aid. Czechoslovakia offered the Salvadoran guerillas nontraceable Czechoslovak arms, circulating in the world market, to be transported in coordination with East Germany. Bulgaria promised German weapons, "rebuilt from World War II," and East Germany was to donate military training, especially for clandestine operations. Ethiopia offered "several thousand weapons" of Western origin, and Vietnam some 60 tons of U.S.-made rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, and ammunition. Nicaragua considered giving Western-manufactured arms in exchange for the communist-made weapons that had been promised the guerillas. Iraq made a \$500,000 "logistic donation" for use in Nicaragua and El Salvador.³⁰

This account leaves out Libya, whose transports were detained in Brazil for ferrying arms to Managua in 1983. All of this could have come about spontaneously, of course, reflecting each ally's comparative advantage in the free market of proxy services. But it is possible to multiply examples of Soviet bloc interventions requiring fairly elaborate coordination between different clients, all of which suggests some degree centralized planning by either Moscow or Havana. In the summer of 1973, Soviet ships were used to transport PDRY troops to support the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. Guinea-Bissau served as a staging base for Cuban planes on their way to Angola in 1976. Soviet planes were used to airlift Soviet and East European equipment and Cuban combat troops to Ethiopia in 1977-78, using logistics facilities previously established in the PDRY.³¹ Conversely, when South Yemeni president Selim Rubai Ali was overthrown by Abd al-Fattah Ismail in 1978, forces loyal to Ismail were supported once again by Cuban troops, ferried by Soviet aircraft this time from Ethiopia. And in late 1981 Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen signed a tripartite pact with Soviet encouragement codifying their relationship of mutual support.

³⁰Quoted in Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* (Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 102-103.

³¹Another example of Soviet-Cuban coordination is the fact that Moscow supplied some 30 pilots to Cuba to replace Cuban pilots who had been sent to Ethiopia.

Needless to say, the tactical principles I have outlined above do not apply universally to all Soviet Third World clients; there are several countries in which Moscow has a large stake that have remained free of substantial penetration and do not seem to participate actively in the socialist collective security system. Syria, for example, has been a major Soviet preoccupation in 1982-83 and the object of political and military investment on a level not seen in the Middle East since 1970. Despite Assad's eventual signature of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1980, Syria continues to manifest a prickly independence from Soviet control, as evident in its disregard of Soviet wishes in its crushing of the PLO in Lebanon. In spite of the large number of Soviet combat forces manning SA-5 and other sites in Syria, there is little question that Assad could dismiss them as Sadat did; it is Rifaat Assad and not some East German intelligence operative who controls internal security throughout Syria. India as well has remained aloof from the Soviets since the Afghan invasion. Generally speaking, the new tactics to make Soviet influence more permanent have a chance of succeeding only in countries without highly developed national traditions or institutions. It is precisely those regimes with weak power bases and minimal internal legitimacy that are most dependent on Soviet bloc support, and for that reason susceptible to penetration and control. Hence the Soviet client with perhaps the weakest internal position of all, Afghanistan, eventually became the beneficiary of the largest Soviet presence.

Finally, it should be noted that the success of these new tactics is far from assured. Moscow's degree of control over countries within the "system" varies widely and nowhere approaches the level of influence achieved over its Eastern European allies after World War II. For example, South Yemen is by most criteria the most thoroughly penetrated of the Soviet clients, being a self-avowed Marxist-Leninist state, signatory of a Friendship Treaty, host to Soviet combat forces, etc. Yet Marxism remains a thin veneer in South Yemeni politics; the rivalries within the ruling party in the PDRY remain tribal, regional, and sectarian at heart, and may yet lead to an erosion of the Soviet position there.¹² The fact that the new Soviet approach to the Third

¹²For an excellent discussion of internal PDRY politics, see Laurie

World may not ultimately work or is not of universal applicability does not make it less of a "system", however, or a useful tool for predicting future Soviet behavior.

IV. THE FUTURE

We have seen how Soviet Third World policy has been shaped both by the search for positions of concrete geostrategic value, particularly in the 1950s and 60s, and that Moscow has in the past decade made efforts to improve the quality of its influence with existing or recently acquired clients as well. The question remains as to the future of Soviet policy.

It would appear that the big Soviet push for major new geostrategic positions is largely finished now, and that this factor will be much less important in the rest of this decade than previously. The reason for this lies in the past success of Soviet policy. The U.S.-orchestrated containment barrier was largely broken by the sixties, partly through Soviet efforts and partly through local developments like the Iraqi revolution where Moscow played little role. The Soviets currently have incomparably better access to the oceans and airspace around their periphery than they did in 1955. Similarly, the Soviets were able to implement forward naval deployments in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, southern Pacific and Caribbean in the following decade. It is difficult to identify a pressing strategic requirement that will determine the future course of Soviet Third World policy in a parallel fashion.

This is of course not to say that the Soviets would not gladly accept a base in the Philippines or Iran if one fell into their laps, or would spurn an offer to return to Somalia or Egypt. The Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area in particular remains of great strategic significance and one in which Soviet access and support could stand considerable improvement. The traditional Russian attitude towards security suggests that they have certain congenital difficulties in

Mylroie, *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges* N-2052-AF (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1984).

admitting that enough is enough. In any event, since Soviet expansionism is largely opportunity-driven, major developments will be dependent on regional stimuli beyond Moscow's control.

The real question, however, is to what degree military interests narrowly defined rather than broad political concerns will shape policy, and the price Moscow will be willing to pay to acquire new bases and facilities. As noted above, there is evidence of at least a certain faction within the Soviet leadership which is reluctant to take on costly new obligations in the Third World to clients of dubious staying power and reliability. Since this viewpoint appears to be associated with Andropov himself, the impact of these views on actual policy may depend on the state of his health or the outcome of an Andropov succession struggle. In any case, we do not see Gorshkov lobbying as energetically or as visibly for access to particular countries as he did in the mid-1960s.

On the other hand, the other issue I have raised concerning the quality of existing client relationships does seem to be one with which the Soviets will continue to have to contend. Particularly if there is a retrenchment in Soviet Third World policy for economic or security related reasons, the Soviets are going to have to be concerned with making the best of what they already have. Unlike the acquisition of new clients, moreover, this is one area in which the Soviets have some room for initiative and creativity in policy. This suggests that in the future we may see something like a bimodal distribution of close Soviet clients: one grouping would consist of those like Vietnam and Syria which are important for their strategic position, but which remain independent and subject to minimal Soviet control, while at the other end of the spectrum would be a cluster of states like Angola and Mozambique which have lesser strategic value but which are more effectively integrated into the Soviet collective security system.

APPENDIX

The following table is an incomplete list of current Soviet assets, allies, and clients around the world. If we were to include all recipients of Soviet arms transfers and economic aid, the list would have to be expanded considerably to include countries like Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, and Kuwait, which are manifestly not Soviet clients.

Table 1

The Soviet Presence in the Third World

Country	Special Soviet Base or Port Privileges	Soviet Advisors or Combat Forces	Cuban Advisors (1981)	East German Advisors	Friendship Treaty Signatory	Self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist Regime	Value of Sov. Bloc Arms Trans. 1976-80 (millions \$)
Afghanistan	Airbases POL, Logistics facilities	105,000		Yes	1978	Yes	450
Algeria	Refueling Stations Airfield (Annaba)		15				1800
Angola	TU-95s (Luanda) Port privileges (Luanda)		19,000	Yes	1976	Yes	550
Benin			10				20
Cape Verde			10-15				50
Congo- Brazzaville			500				60
Cuba	TU-95s Logistics, POL Repair Fac.	10,000 (Combat) 10,000 (Advisors)				Yes	1100
DPRK					1961	Yes	240
Equatorial Guinea			200				10
Ethiopia	Anchorage at Dahlak Island Airfield at Asmara		100	Yes	1978	Yes	1900
Guinea			50				50
Guinea- Bissau			50	Yes			30
Guyana			5				
India					1971		2300
Iraq			Few		1972		5000
Kampuchea						Yes	10
Libya	Air and naval access		200	Yes			5500
Laos						Yes	180
Madagascar							60
Mozambique	Landing rights Port privileges		300		1977		180
Nicaragua			1500	Yes			?
Panama			30				
People's Dem. Republic of Yemen	Port & airbase (Aden, Perim Is., Makallah)		1000	substantial	1979	Yes	775
Sao Tome and Principe			Few	Yes			
Sierra Leone			100				5
Suriname							?
Syria	Anchorage at Latakia	7,500 (incl. AD combat units)			1980		5400
Tanzania			Few				320
Vietnam	TU-95s, sub- marine & naval facilities					Yes	1900
YAP					1978		625
Zambia			100				100

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